Chr. Michelsen Institute >
CMI Collection (Reports, Working Papers, Articles etc.) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10202/354

Title: Non-Cooperation in Fish Exploitation. The Case of Irreversible Capital Investment in the Arcto-Norwegian Cod Fishery
Authors: Sumaila, Ussif Rashid
Keywords: Game theory
Fishery resources
Coastal vessels
Issue Date: 1994
Publisher: Chr. Michelsen Institute
Series/Report no.: CMI Working paper
WP 1994: 2
Abstract: A two-stage, two-player non-cooperative game model is developed under an irreversible capital investment assumption. The main aim is to predict the number of vessels that each player in such a game will find in his best interest to employ in the exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock, given a non-cooperative environment and the fact that all players are jointly constrained by the population dynamics of the resource. The predictions obtained are then compared with (i) the sole owner's optimal capacity investments for the two players; (ii) the results in Sumaila (1994), where perfect malleabilty of c ap aci t y is assumed implicitly; and (iii) available data on the Arcto-Norwegian cod fishery.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10202/354
ISSN: 0804-3639
Appears in Collections:CMI Collection (Reports, Working Papers, Articles etc.)

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat
WP1994.2 Ussif-07192007_6.pdf2765KbAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.


Feedback Chr. Michelsens Institutt
Fantoftveien 38, 5072 Bergen
E-post: bora@cmi.no