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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10202/151

Title: The evolution of social norms
Authors: Kolstad, Ivar
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory
Social norms
JEL: C73
Issue Date: 2003
Publisher: Chr. Michelsen Institute
Series/Report no.: CMI Working paper
WP 2003: 1
Abstract: Evolutionary game theory provides the tools to analyze which strategies, or patterns of behaviour, emerge over time through a process of adaptation. Social norms can be defined as patterns of behaviour with certain characteristics. Evolutionary game theory thus provides one perspective on how social norms are formed and maintained. Prisoner’s dilemma games can be used to study the conditions under which cooperative norms emerge. Bargaining games can be used to address the formation of fairness norms. However, being more congenial to analyzing norms that somehow focus on material payoffs, it is not a given that evolutionary game theory can adequately address norms focusing on rights or virtues.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10202/151
ISBN: 82-8062-044-3
ISSN: 0804-3639
Appears in Collections:CMI Collection (Reports, Working Papers, Articles etc.)

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